Evolutionary game and simulation of organizational information security investment
Wei Sun1, Yang Yu2
COMPUTER MODELLING & NEW TECHNOLOGIES 2014 18(1) 276-282
1 Business School, Liaoning University, Shenyang, 110136, P.R.China
2 Institute of Systems Engineering, Northeastern University, Shenyang, 110819, P.R.China
To investigate the evolution law of organizational information security investment, this paper analyses evolutionary stable strategies of organizational information security investments using evolutionary game theory and verifies the evolutionary stable strategies through the simulation based on Repast, a multi-agent simulation platform. First, according to the bounded rationality of actual organizations, this paper sets up the evolutionary game model of organizational information security investment. And then, we investigate the evolutionary stable strategies by replicator dynamics. Finally, we simulate the evolutionary game by Repast based on Java programming language, and the experimental results verify the evolutionary stable strategies obtained from the theoretical analysis. The research results can be used to predict the long-term stable trend of organizational information security investment, state that investment cost is the key for organizations to choose the strategy, and provide decision support for organizational information security investment.