Evolutionary game analysis of enterprises’ technological innovation strategies

Nannan Duan^{1, 2}, Fuyuan Xu¹, Ming Ni²

COMPUTER MODELLING & NEW TECHNOLOGIES 18(6) 230-239

¹Business School, University of Shanghai for Science & Technology, Shanghai, China, 200093
²School of Economics and Management, East China JiaoTong University, Nanchang, China, 330013

Different from general studies on competition and/or cooperation relationship of enterprises, the paper classified enterprises’ technological innovation strategies into cooperation, neutrality and competition, and analysed the evolution of enterprises’ relationship and strategy selection in technological innovation using the evolutionary game method and the MATLAB simulation technique. The paper drew the following conclusions: (1) the increase in technological content may cause two uncertain cases of enterprises’ strategy, namely both parties chose the cooperation strategy, or one party chose the cooperation strategy while the other party chose the noncooperation strategy; (2) the increase in innovation revenue (coefficient) prompted enterprises to eventually tend towards the cooperative innovation strategy, no matter what the initial relationship between enterprises was; (3) the increase in the number of enterprises with the neutrality attitude promoted enterprise groups to tend towards cooperative innovation.