RESEARCH ON SUPPLY CHAIN COMPETITION ADVANTAGE UNDER REPEATED GAMES

Yu Yue¹, Hu Yong-shi², Xu Ming-xing^{1, 3}

¹School of Economics & Management, Fuzhou University, Fuzhou City, Fujian Province, China, 350108

²Department of Traffic and Transportation, Fujian University of Technology, Fuzhou City, Fujian Province, China, 350108

³Concord University College of Fujian Normal University, Fuzhou City, Fujian Province, China, 350117

To reveal whether the order of supply chains’ competition exerts an effect on the their profits and whether the repeated game interferences this effect, the paper builds a Stackelberg game model constructed by two supply chains with each containing a supplier and a retailer based on the previous studies. Through comparing respective profits of the leading and following supply chain represented by ‘Copycat’, this paper concludes that the following supply chain is more likely to gain more profits than the leading one in this case, and this advantage is determined by the order of decision-making itself. Under repeated games, the possibility of the following supply chain to be more profitable and the approaches to make decisions will be related to the substitutable coefficient.